On Tue, 2004-09-21 at 13:25 -0400, Theodore Ts'o wrote: > On Mon, Sep 20, 2004 at 09:02:18PM -0600, Alex Williamson wrote: > > > But, some AML methods are risky to be called directly from user space, > > > Not only because the side effect of its execution, but also because > > > it could trigger potential AML method bug or interpreter bug, or even > > > architectural defect. All of these headache is due to the AML method > > > is NOT intended for being used by userspace program. > > > > I've made an attempt to hide the most obvious dangerous methods, but > > undoubtedly, there will be some. Why are we any more likely to hit an > > AML method bug, interpreter bug or architectural bug by having a > > userspace interface? > > As long as the userspace interfaces are only available to the root > filesystem, I'm not sure it's worth it to hide any of the methods. > It's added complexity, and in any case, root can do untold amounts of > damage by writing to /dev/mem, trying to upload firmware to IDE > drives, etc., etc., etc. Yes, very true. I think the difference is that in my current implementation, objects are evaluated on read. This makes it terribly easy to do the wrong thing "Hmm, I wonder what that file does... oops". Evaluating on write would set the bar a little higher, but still has some of the same issues. In theory, I definitely agree, the interface shouldn't need to hide anything. (I'm sure there are ACPI firmware folks frightened by that idea) Thanks, Alex -- Alex Williamson HP Linux & Open Source Lab - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-ia64" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.htmlReceived on Tue Sep 21 14:11:30 2004
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