>>>>> On Mon, 2 Jun 2003 10:00:28 -0700, "Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@intel.com> said: Tony> At the moment the trust level is extremely high. Linux Tony> doesn't even provide a checksum for the ia64_os_mca_dispatch Tony> entry code when it registers it with the SAL. That's true. Tony> A checksum in the list of saved translations would only be Tony> part of reducing the level of trust ... we'd also need to Tony> validate that the entire code path has the correct code (not Tony> just the entry point). There are several other data items on Tony> which the code also relies which a truly paranoid MCA handler Tony> would also need to validate. I probably just don't understand what the plan is here. Are you planning to fix everything in one fell swoop? If not, I think incrementally improving the situation makes sense (i.e., if you work on piece X, make X as solid as possible; over time do this for more and more pieces of the MCA subsystem). There is no doubt that making the entire MCA subsystem as robust as possible involves a huge amount of rather tricky work. Same goes for the INIT path, of course (there are obvious ways to deadlock it right now; probably something that could benefit from a reasonably generic lock-busting infrastructure). --davidReceived on Mon Jun 02 11:20:43 2003
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